

The Business Models of French Wines, Between Continuity and Adaptation: The Example of Champagne Wines

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Abstract

◦Purpose – Our study emphasises the evolution of the French wine industry from the example of the Champagne vineyard. As, the adaptations within the sector are based on a progressive evolution of individual exploitations, we base our analysis on the business model framework methodology (Osterwalder and Pigneur et al., 2010), that describes in a systematic way the processes of value creation and capture. We combine this with the strategy tripod model (Peng et al., 2009) to understand the extent to which pressures from the institutional context, accessible resources and competitive positioning can influence individual business models (BM).

◦Design/methodology/approach – We build on the multiple case study method (Yin, 2009). All organisations' business models were analysed by applying the business model canvas (BMC). A site visit was made to each wine company, aimed at analysing its BMC. The visits were spread over several one-week periods between 2015 and 2019. Primary data obtained in our visits were supplemented by secondary data from specialist newspaper articles and companies' websites. Historical data pertaining to wine regions were obtained from the extant literature on the topic

◦Findings – Our hypothesis is that the institutional context forces estates to adopt common positioning, resources, and ultimately an archetypal BM, while leaving them some capacity for variation. It contributes to raising barriers to entry, freezing the hierarchy of domains, favouring the most prestigious ones to the detriment of others. We found that some producers may, however, decide to bypass this institutional framework in order to mobilise specific

resources, adopt a differentiated competitive positioning and, therefore, an innovative BM. Yet, our analysis does not allow us to conclude that these innovative BMs manage to modify the archetypal one in depth.

◦Practical implications – This paper contributes to a renewed analysis of the wine sector by adopting a multi layered perspective, combining micro- and meso-economic analyses. It highlights the fact that there is no “one size fits all” model within the French wine industry, but rather a wide range of strategies that may be encountered within a single wine region.

Key words: wine industry, business model, competitive positioning, resources, institutions

1. INTRODUCTION

The wine industry is one of the most dynamic sectors of the French economy in terms of its contribution to the country's GDP and foreign trade. It occupies a leading position worldwide, with 17% of world production in volume, of which a third is exported. For the past twenty years, it has been undergoing continuous change in order to adapt to new conditions of global competition, as well as to new consumption habits in France, Europe, the US and emerging markets. The French wine industry is complex, framed by a dense institutional environment, combining national and European regulations, agricultural, civil, rural, tax, commercial and administrative law. It is also marked by very strong local identities in the different vineyards which do not allow it to be analysed as a homogeneous entity at the national level.

Evolutions in the sector have been mostly analysed from a governance viewpoint, while analyses at the individual level are still scarce (Alonso Ugaglia et al., 2019). yet, their conclusions are rather clear: there is no “one size fits all” model but rather a wide range of strategies that may be encountered within a single wine region.

This paper contributes to this recent surge for renewing analyses of this sector by adopting a multi layered perspective, combining micro- and meso-economic perspectives. Our starting point is the Business Model (BM) (Osterwalder et al., 2010), a model that describes the process of value creation, distribution and capture by a given organisation in a systematic way. Adaptations within the industry indeed require a progressive evolution of individual business models, in the first place those of the wineries.

We combine this analysis with a global model developed by Peng et al (2009), called the "strategy tripod". The latter integrates industry-based, resource-based and institution-based perspectives on strategy. This allows us to articulate the BM's microeconomic perspective with a mesoeconomic one, as suggested by the components of the tripod. More specifically, we seek to understand to what extent the tensions between the institutional environment in which

business organisations operate, the resources available and the possible competitive positions, can influence individual BMs.

Our hypothesis is that, in a logic of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the institutional framework forces businesses to adopt a common competitive position, exploit similar resources, and ultimately a adopt a 'typical' BM, common to the vast majority of them, while leaving them some room for manoeuvre. This institutional framework contributes to erecting barriers to entry and settling positions within a vineyard, favouring the most prestigious ones to the detriment of others. Some producers can then choose to ignore this institutional framework to mobilise specific resources, a differentiated competitive positioning and, therefore, an innovative BM.

2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND

2.1. The business model framework

The business model (BM) is a framework that describes under what conditions, in what ways and with what means a company plans to develop and exploit a competitive advantage in order to create economic value and capture a share of it. It is traditionally attributed to P. Drucker in his 1954 book "The Practice of Management". The concept was propagated in the late 1990s with the emergence of Internet start-ups. It is nowadays commonly applied far beyond this particular context. We will consider how BM analysis fits into the field of strategic management, which explores issues related to the development of competitive advantage and rent-seeking.

According to Verstraete et al (2012), a BM is a convention aimed at 'making sense of a company's business'. In fact, there are several ways of representing a BM. According to the same authors, it is the representation of a business expressing how value is generated, remunerated, and shared (GRS representation). For our part, we use the Business Model Canvas (BMC) representation developed by Osterwalder et al, (2010). It models the BM of a company based on nine descriptive blocks, grouped into four components (Figure 1):

- **Supply:** the value proposition is at the heart of the model. It is the set of products and services of the company that create value for its customers.
- **Infrastructure:** value-creating activities are the main activities involved in producing the good or service, and the main resources and partners they require.
- **Customer:** Value transmission and capture activities describe the company's customer segments, its relationships with those customers and the distribution channels for the value proposition.

- Economic viability: balance between cost structure and revenue streams.

The strength of this representation and the reason why we adopt it is that it provides a set of entry points and pathways for each entrepreneur to define his/her own creative process, while highlighting the interactions between the blocks and their logic in a systemic perspective. From a methodological point of view, this representation provides us with a unique analysis grid, enabling a systematic comparison of different organisations within the same industry.




Figure 1: The business model Canvas (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010)

The relationship between BM and strategy is equivocal: for Zott & Amit, (2008), they are two distinct areas of analysis. However, according to Desreumaux, (2014), the BM is a 'sort of open participative frame' that can be mobilised from several angles, some of which we will detail in the following section (cf. infra, 2.2): the BM does not substitute to previously existing models, but rather acts as a potential 'toolbox' into which they can be transposed.

The BM approach can also be used in a dynamic perspective (Reboud et al., 2021). The alteration by a company of one or more elements of a business model is then defined as a business model innovation (Björkdahl Holmén, 2013) and, given the synergies existing between the components, the change of one of them leads to adaptations of all the others. BM innovation

is said by some authors to result in higher returns than simple product or process innovations (Massa Tucci, 2013).

According to Teece, (2018), Business Model, strategy and dynamic capabilities are interdependent: it is through its dynamic capabilities - understood as 'the result of (i) a sum of processes or routines (ii) whose intentional purpose is to adapt the firm to the environment and enable it to exploit opportunities' - that a firm can steer the evolution of its Business Model and its organisational competencies (Burger-Helmchen Frank, 2011; p. 91).

The BM framework is often criticised for focusing on 'micro-organisational problems and phenomena' and neglecting issues relating to the environment of the firm, a criticism also levelled at the dominant literature in strategy (Desreumaux, 2014). This is in fact forgetting that BMs are shaped by their environments (legal, economic, technological, cultural), which represent both a constraint binding actions and resources to be exploited (Zott et al., 2011).

Authors such as Verstraete et al, (2018) have sought to fill this gap from a conventionalist perspective: if a BM is as such a convention, namely a 'collective cognitive device', or a 'form of shared representation', it does not exist in vacuum, and must therefore take into account the 'conventions of the social spaces' within which it operates. Although our research does not follow a conventionalist approach, we feel that this work contributes to the analysis of BMs by 'opening' them up to take their environment into account.

2.2. The strategy tripod

We develop hereafter a global scheme for analysing BMs using the strategy tripod, a model developed by Peng et al (2009) to reconcile three schools of thought in the young and fragmented discipline of strategy (Chabaud & Sattin, 2018). The objective is first to articulate the microeconomic approach of the BM and a broader perspective suggested by the components of the tripod. In a second step, we seek to show how one of these components, the institution-based view, influences the other two, the resource-based and industry-based views, and ultimately individual organisations' BM.

The first leg of the tripod is the "industry-based" or "competitive positioning" view (Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999; Porter, 1980). Based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (Bain, 1959) and made popular by Porter in the 1980s, this school emphasises the demand, supply and competitive conditions in which companies find themselves, which largely determine their strategies and performance. A company must therefore build and maintain its competitive advantage by strengthening its competitive position in its industry (Porter, 1980). This perspective gave rise to the famous 'five force' and 'generic strategy' models in the 1980s and,

in the 1990s, and later to the 'competitiveness of nations' model still widely used today (Porter, 1998).

The value proposition, which is at the heart of a BM, and the 'customer' block address issues raised by this school of thought: Why do our customers choose the company's products? What is the unique value created by the company? To what extent does the company's offer differ from that of its competitors in the eyes of customers?

At the other end of the spectrum, the value proposition combined with resources, partners and value creation activities is effortlessly compatible with the second leg of the tripod, namely the resource-based view, developed by authors such as Barney (1991), Penrose (2009), Peteraf (1993) or Wernerfelt (1984). Resources are defined as 'tangible or intangible assets that firms use to design and implement their strategies' (J. Barney, 1991), including land, buildings, equipment, as well as brand reputation, trademarks or intellectual property. These resources can be classified into four categories (Barney, 1997):

- Financial capital, including monetary resources that can be used to design and implement strategies.
- Physical capital, including the physical technology used, plant and equipment, geographical location, access to raw materials.
- Human capital, including the training, experience, judgement, intelligence, relationships and insight of individual managers and workers.
- Organisational capital, similar to human capital but referring to the attributes of groups rather than individuals.

Based on the assumption that resources are heterogeneous and idiosyncratic, this approach suggests that a firm's sustainable competitive advantage depends primarily on the strategic, distinctive resources it possesses or can access. Resources can therefore be internal to the firm, but also external, for example when the firm uses external partners (subcontractors, etc.) or due to positive externalities. In his VRIN model, Barney (1991) considers that resources can be considered as strategic when they are useful (valuable, V), rare (R), inimitable (I) and non-substitutable (N).

To these first two pillars, which are already largely integrated into the WB model, we add the institutional environment of the company, which defines the framework for its action. This "institution-based view" builds on a corpus that combines institutional economics (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985) and sociological institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It suggests that the behaviour and performance of a company depend in part on the components of its institutional environment (Monticelli et al., 2018; Peng et al., 2009). This institutional

perspective seems essential to us in the wine industry, where institutions, both formal and informal, play, as we shall see, a key role in the strategies of actors.

Institutions are defined by North (1990, 2005) as a set of rules, representations and common mental frameworks, tacit or explicit. They can be formal (laws and regulations) or informal (norms and values). They indicate whether a particular form of behaviour is acceptable or not, limiting the range of conventional actions, while reducing uncertainty and thus transaction costs (Ditter & Brouard, 2012). Successful firms are therefore those that conform and adapt to institutional pressures in order to gain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991), or those that are able to influence the institutional framework (Dockès, 1999). A firm's BM must therefore take account of its institutional environment, which frames and constrains its actions, leading it to mimic its competitors, a phenomenon that DiMaggio & Powell (1983) describe as 'institutional isomorphism'.

Institutional isomorphism can be analysed along three dimensions (Scott, 1995). The regulatory (or legal) dimension consists of the capacity to produce rules, to attest to their respect and, if necessary, to impose sanctions. Coercive institutions are thus defined as a set of rules and a system of sanctions that constrain the behaviour of actors. The normative (or social) dimension implies that institutions guide individual behaviour by defining what is expected or appropriate under specific circumstances. Normative institutions, such as values and norms, are therefore intended to guide agents by providing them with criteria for decision-making. They are not sources of sanctions but can be as binding as coercive institutions. Finally, the cultural dimension includes symbols (words, signs and gestures), as well as cultural rules, which guide our understanding of reality. They consist of mental frameworks associated with specific forms of behaviour.

The institutional perspective understands institutions as a "way of regulating the conflicts inherent in the divergence of interests and power positions" (Théret, 2000). Taking up Williamson's (1985) analytical schemes, Croidieu and Monin (2011) distinguish between institutional players, governance structures and institutional logics. The former are individual or collective actors who interact in a given institutional field. They may occupy a dominant position or seek to challenge the position of other actors. These power relationships are institutionalised by governance structures which, through norms and laws, structure the field and the practices of the players. Finally, players behave according to a certain number of dominant beliefs, values and practices, called institutional logics of action.

For North (1990), institutions are imposed on economic agents as the 'rules of the game' but are themselves a product of their behaviour and strategies, as well as the compromises they

reach in the course of their interactions (Ditter & Brouard, 2012). A key 'game changer' is the institutional entrepreneur, defined as an agent 'who creates norms, models, values and behaviours consistent with (his/her) identity and (his/her) interests, which (s)he establishes as standard and legitimate vis-à-vis others' (DiMaggio, 1988; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). The main characteristic of the institutional entrepreneur is his/her ability to forge new connections that defend and promote his/her own interests and help to shape a new configuration of the network in which (s)he operates (Boyer et al., 2007).

The perspectives developed by the 'tripod' highlight the possible tensions between the three components of a company's strategy and their repercussions on its BM: whereas industry- and resource-based views encourage the company to distinguish itself from its competitors (differentiated positioning and distinctive resources), the institution-based view emphasises, on the contrary, mimicry in the quest for legitimacy under an institutional isomorphism logic (Peng et al., 2009). We suggest that institutions, both formal and informal, are a centripetal force that largely affects the other two pillars of the tripod, which are themselves centrifugal forces: they constrain both the resources that firms can activate, the conditions of competition and, ultimately, their positioning and therefore their value proposition (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: The business model canvas and the strategy tripod, adapted from Osterwalder et al. (2011); Peng & Khoury (2009)

These tensions are strong in the French wine industry, where history, culture and the PDO system impose strong constraints in terms of competitive positioning (differentiation by origin), the availability and use of resources (e.g. constraints on irrigation, origin of grapes), production processes (e.g. yields), components of the final product (e.g. authorised grape varieties), or even communication (authorised mentions on labels). We thus consider a vineyard as a set of specific institutions in a given geographical space, which contribute to its identity and facilitate interactions between agents (Ditter & Brouard, 2012, 2014). The example of Burgonéo developed by Asselineau (2010) shows how an original BM, yet neglecting its institutional environment, led to the failure of the entrepreneurial project.

We can deduce that each particular institutional environment corresponds to a 'standard BM' applied by businesses (wineries, traders), which will then seek to differentiate themselves within their imposed framework. This hypothesis will be tested in the next part of this study, which will also enable us to highlight how certain actors will differentiate themselves within a given institutional environment, or even refuse institutional isomorphism in order to call on new resources, develop an original positioning and, ultimately, BM innovations (Laifi, 2012) (see figure 3).




Figure 3: Articulating business models and the strategy tripod (own research)

3. ANALYSING THE CHAMPAGNE VINEYARDS

3.1. Research methodology

We build on the multiple case study method (Yin 2009), that helps ‘predict similar results or produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons’ (Johnston et al. 1999: 206). All business models were analysed by applying the BMC methodology (Osterwalder, Pigneur et al., 2010). The analysis is based on the description of the economic models of four champagne houses, four family estates and one combined exploitation. A visit was made to each wine company, which led to the drafting of its business model canvas. The visits were spread over several one-week periods between 2015 and 2019. Primary data obtained in our visits were supplemented by secondary data from specialist newspaper articles and companies’ websites. Historical data pertaining to wine regions were obtained from the extant literature on the topic.

Table 1: field visits

	Core business	Status	Size (hectares)	Date of interview
E1	Wine maker	Family estate	8	2015
E2	Merchant	Independent champagne house	36	2015-2018 (2 visits)
E3	Merchant	Subsidiary champagne house	388	2015
E4	Merchant	Subsidiary champagne house	250	2015
E6	Wine maker	Family estate	18	2018
E7	Wine maker	Family estate	14	2018
E8	Merchant	Independent champagne house	10	2018
E9	Wine maker	Family estate	7	2019
E10	Wine maker, merchant	Champagne house Family estate	25	2019
E11	Wine maker	Family estate	8	2019

The Champagne vineyard was selected for various reasons. First, its size and its worldwide reputation for quality are such that it is one of the biggest contributors to French foreign trade, and a driving force for the evolution of the wine industry and, especially, of quality wines at the global level. Furthermore, it has a long-lasting history, giving rise to distinct institutional traits, which we can find in the resources, competitive positioning and ultimately the BM of local producers. In Champagne, winegrowing emerged in the Middle Ages and became a world leader and model for the production of sparkling wines at the turn of the twentieth century.

3.2. Champagne: history and institutions

The champagne vineyard represents nearly 34,000 hectares, i.e. just over 4% of the French vineyards, and produces about 302 million bottles. Yet, it accounts for 33% of French wine exports in value. The production, elaboration and marketing of champagne is based on more than 16,000 small growers who cultivate the vast majority of the region (90%), 132 wine cooperatives and 320 wine merchants (*maisons de champagne* or champagne houses) (Comité

Champagne, 2020). The latter are at the root of the reputation and prestige of Champagne wines, especially for export. Their size and strategies are very different, with production ranging from 20,000 to several million bottles for 'grandes maisons'.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, champagne houses have sought to develop exports, relying in particular on the networks they had built up in the textile trade. The region specialised in sparkling wines, which were the most in demand, particularly in the German and British markets (Guy 2003). Houses then adopted a strategy of increasing the quality of the product in order to further develop these external markets. They also set up a communication strategy via their decorated labels bearing the names of the brands (poster, painting, music, newspaper advertising). The luxury image of champagne thus dates back to this period (Guy 2003).

At the same time, the distribution of roles in the sector was settled, between growers who produced the grapes and sold them to merchants and the latter, who carried out the blending, created the sparkling wine and marketed it. The relationships between champagne houses and the growers are still today mostly organised on a long-term basis. However, most houses also own their own vineyards, particularly in the most prestigious areas (crus). Even though most of the production is sold to merchants, growers, for their part, often market bottles under their own name and brand.

It was also during the nineteenth century that many legal protection procedures were undertaken, leading to the creation of the Champagne AOC (PDO) in 1936. The recognition of the appellation consecrated the specificity of this collective heritage and contributed to the establishment of champagne as a luxury good. For this type of good, as can also be the case for a perfume, the value not only derives from the manufacturing cost, but also integrates the idea, creativity, culture, image and heritage (Barrère 2007), as well as specific localisation resources and know-how (Smith Maguire and Charters 2021).

3.3. BMs in the champagne vineyard: analysis and results

The ownership and promotion of the historically acquired heritage, which cannot be relocated, is an essential asset of these businesses which, even if they are luxury products, can be manufactured industrially by companies owned by financial groups such as LVMH, the world leader in the luxury industry.

These heritage aspects are thus highly valued and maintained through communication and event strategies, particularly by champagne houses (Smith Maguire and Charters 2021). The most important ones offer paying visits and host a large number of visitors, while other houses and

estates only organise visits and tastings for professional customers. Visits for the general public focus on historical aspects and tours of the vineyard, winery and cellars. Other types of events are also organised: polo games or cruises, contemporary art exhibitions, food and wine tastings in the prestigious hotels and restaurants owned by the houses.

These events can be offered as wine tourism services, but they are considered more for high-end houses as designed to welcome guests who will play the role of product prescribers and brand ambassadors. Specialist magazines and guides (Bettane+Desseauve, Guide Hachette) play an essential prescription role for all interviewed estates and houses. In terms of wine tourism, champagne houses place greater emphasis on the 'champagne' product and its luxurious symbolism, while growers put greater value on the terroir, which may cause tensions in the collective definition of what the heritage of champagne is and actions for promoting it (Gatelier et al. 2014; Smith Maguire and Charters 2021).

If the biggest houses producing several million bottles per year sell in supermarkets and massively export their production, other actors put emphasis on traditional channels (hospitality, wine boutiques) and direct sales (with a reservation system in some cases), but above all export (from 40% to 75% of their production). Digital communication is relatively limited and is rather the focus of the biggest champagne houses, which have dedicated staff for these tasks. There is generally no sale via houses' and growers' websites but rather through specialised sites (e.g. La Champagnerie, Lavinia, Idealwine, Carré des vins).

Today's less clear-cut differentiation between champagne and sparkling wines that partly explains their (relative) loss of competitiveness. Indeed, since the 2008 crisis, the champagne industry has suffered from declining shipments while, during the same period, the sparkling wine market has grown very significantly in volume (France Agrimer 2019). Champagne growers have been the hardest hit by this competition from sparkling wines produced in France (Crémants from Alsace, Burgundy, Loire), and also abroad (prosecco from Italy, cava from Spain) (Ringeval-Deluze 2019).




Figure 4: Merchants' business model




Figure 5: Estates' traditional business model

Our interviews show a recent evolution in the business models of champagne vintners and houses. First, there is an evolution in the supply of champagne produced in organic agriculture or even biodynamic agriculture. This proportion of organic certified champagne is still low compared to other regions (only 2.9% compared with 12% for France overall), but many claim

the right to treat if necessary (and therefore not to be certified) while having changed their cultural practices (e.g. limiting herbicides, grassing plots, tillage).

In this perspective, champagne houses display various certifications such as Sustainable Viticulture in Champagne, HEV (High Environmental Value), ISO 9001 and 14001. One house claims to offer the first eco-citizen champagne, a juxtaposition of sustainable development approaches, including viticultural practices as much as the reduction in the weight of bottles or the use of labels printed on recycled paper.




Figure 6: An evolution of estates' business model

Furthermore, the search for new, younger customers is one of the strategies pursued, especially by the houses. This strategy involves developing product innovations (Cuvée Bulles d'argent, small format for consumption through a straw or directly from the bottle, different glass shapes), processes, distribution channels (online sales sites) and consumption times and methods (night clubs or bars, cocktails). New players may also emerge. Some companies break with the luxury and heritage image of champagne: a different process, an original and offbeat back label or the use of new technologies such as augmented reality.

In today's highly competitive sparkling wine market, there is a heterogeneity of profiles, with some houses seeking to develop new activities (wine tourism) and to rejuvenate their consumer targets (product innovations, in terms of marketing) while others continue to present themselves as houses whose high-end champagne is dedicated to connoisseurs. Among the growers, there

are also different profiles, from the producer seeking to offer a terroir champagne with a good quality/price ratio compared to that of the houses to the estate that offers a top-of-the-range champagne from a limited number of cuvees.

4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper aimed to provide a first analysis of the extent to which the institutional environment of a given French vineyard, that of Champagne, could influence the positioning, resources and ultimately the BM of its operations, but also the extent to which they can deviate from it. The results obtained show that, for most estates and merchants estates studied, the reference to the traditional BMs of the vineyard remains unavoidable, even though each of them presents more or less marked deviations from it. Local institutions are not questioned because they provide efficiency and stability both to the estates and merchants.

Yet, some estate among those analysed have developed a specific BM at several levels (value proposition, resources, customer relations, marketing channels). These BM innovations allow them to differentiate themselves in terms of resources and products and to better capture the added value created by avoiding the intermediation of merchants. Although it seems to be proving its effectiveness and attractiveness to a few estates, this new BM does not seem to fit into a logic of institutional entrepreneurship: its knock-on effects are limited and do not call into question the entire system.

These initial results lead us to consider several directions for future research. The first direction would be to look more closely at the behaviour of individual producers in response to their institutional environment, based on the work of Oliver (1991). The latter identifies five possible strategic responses - acceptance, compromise, avoidance, contestation, manipulation - to the pressure of the institutional environment, all of which can have an impact on the BM of individual estates.

A second line of research, complementary to the previous one, would aim at deepening the understanding of the interactions between the 'meso' and 'micro' levels of our model in a dynamic perspective. While the influence of the institutional environment on the BM of a vineyard's estate is fairly well understood, the channels through which BM innovations can influence the vineyard's institutional environment are less well known. Our model thus offers an interesting framework for analysing the transformation of an entrepreneur into an institutional entrepreneur.

The third axis is comparative: the famous "Judgment of Paris" of May 1976 marked the recognition of the quality of Californian wines by experts from traditional producing countries.

The Californian vineyard has not ceased to develop and to gain in reputation to the point of becoming a reference in a context of globalisation of the sector, to the point that one comes to evoke a progressive "Californization" of the vineyards of the "Old World". It would be interesting to carry out a longitudinal and comparative study of BMs in Champagne and California in order to identify common points, and possible hints of crossed influences.

A final avenue of extension relates to the recent COVID-19 pandemic. The period of lockdown and measures to restrict public access may contribute to questioning local BMs. Further, the use of digital technologies and social media may be reconsidered: can it be considered an acceptable substitute to hospitality services or remain a complement to it? The impact of these recent developments need evaluation. A longitudinal study would thus allow us to improve our knowledge on this issue.

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